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Abstract
A key issue for a state in transition when a new institution is imported into its
domestic economic field is the relationship between the process dynamics of the
formation of the new institution and the corresponding development of the network
between firms. For China, such problems as the loss of the initial goal of the imported
institution are particularly serious. This article studies the foundation of independent
directors and the interlocking network of China’s listed companies created by
independent directors. The article has two main findings: first, the institution creates a
heterogeneous network. During the process, institutional actors with different
backgrounds contribute to the structural heterogeneity of the interlocking network.
Second, the heterogeneous network has feedback on the effectiveness of the
institution. The heterogeneous network may either strengthen or weaken the new
institution depending on the types of network ties. In the analysis, this article shows
how political networks and professional networks are shaped by different independent
directors with different former status and the different effects these networks have on
the institution of independent directors.




Over the past 20 years, building on the concept of corporate governance, the Chinese
government has introduced a set of new institutions to regulate China’s listed compan-
ies in its emerging stock market. A major criticism of these institutions is that most of
them did not function as well expected. For instance, the institution of independent di-
rectors is designed to solve the problem of insider control. In reality, however, many
believed independent directors were just “eye candy,” and there were debates among
researchers on the effectiveness of this institution. These debates and such puzzles of
isomorphism as embedding an imported institution into China’s economic and political
environment suggest that the institutionalization process in an economic field is not
merely about legitimacy, as neoinstitutionalists would suggest. Therefore, to better
understand the institutionalization processes of imported institutions, one needs to
analyze how and in what sense such institutions become effective.
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On the other hand, when we focus on the institution of independent directors, an in-
teresting phenomenon is that when independents began to sit on boards of listed com-
panies, they inevitably reshape the interlocking networks of board directors among
firms. The interlocking of boards has long been taken as an important indicator of the
market structure. As past studies have shown, interlocking networks of American cor-
porations in different historical periods well reflect the market structure of that period.
In early times, the interlocking network centered on railway giants and telegraph and
telephone companies (Roy 1983); large commercial banks and insurance companies
later became the core (Mintz and Schwartz 1981). Upon seeing such reshaped net-
works, network analysts immediately ask which factors influence the network and what
is the effect of the network.
When we combine the network approach with the question of institutionalization in
considering the relationship between networks and institutions, the institutionalization of
independent directors provides an excellent example of a new explanation of the inter-
locking of boards in China, enhances our knowledge of isomorphism, and discovers more
connections between network theory and the theory of neoinstitutionalism.
Therefore, the article is an exploratory effort that reveals how the institutionalization
of independent directors reshaped boards’ interlocking networks and what the conse-
quences of such networks are in terms of the effectiveness of the institution.
Actors in the institutionalization process
Let us first look at the interlocking network of independents. As is known to all, listed
companies are giants in China’s economy. According to a piece of news in 2011,1 at the
end of the first half of 2011, the total revenue of listed companies in China’s A-share
markets had reached about 10 trillion—around half of the entire country’s half-year
GDP. Meanwhile, these giants’ various kinds of managerial problems continued to be
disclosed. Beginning in 2000, China introduced the institution of independent directors
in seeking to regulate serious insider control problems and protect the interest of small
shareholders.
A rapid wave of institutionalization was seen among firms soon after the 2001 opin-
ion2 was issued by CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission); by 2003, most
listed companies had filled their boards with new independent directors.3 Together
with the fact that the CSRC forbids nonindependent directors,4 this ensured the status
of independent directors. At 2006, three fourths of board interlocking ties were created
by independents (Duan 2009; Duan and Zhong 2008).
With the foundation of a new institution, there comes a new network, but how can
we explain the differences in companies’ network positions at the firm level? Which
companies were more likely to be linked with others? The existing literature includes
thorough discussions on board interlocking. Mizruchi summarizes this literature in his
reviews (1996). According to him, there are five major theories. The first is collusion
theory (Mizruchi 1982; Baker and Faulkner 1993), which states that firms form alliances
by sharing directors in order to reduce intercompetition. This theory, he argues, is diffi-
cult to test empirically since we usually cannot be certain that we can recognize firms’
real motivations. The second is co-optation and monitoring (Pfeffer 1972; Burt 2009),
which views boards’ interlocking as an attempt to reduce environmental uncertainty.
The third theory is legitimacy (Selznick 1984; Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and
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Rowan 1997): firms interlock with important firms to increase their own legitimacy.
Mizruchi believes this predicts firm behavior similar to that predicted by co-optation
theory. The fourth is career advancement (Stokman et al. 1988): directors as individuals
create interlocks to enlarge their own networks. The last theory is social cohesion
(Mills 1999; Domhoff 2006), which asserts that interlocks are forms of upper-class so-
cial cohesion. Each of these theories only deals with a particular historical period; for
instance, Mizruchi points out that collusion theory is suitable only for explaining inter-
locking on American corporate boards before 1914.
These theories can be seen from three angles. The first is the organization vs. the in-
dividual (Zheng 2012; Lu and Chen 2009). This view believes that collusion, legitimacy,
and co-optation all start from the motivation of firms, while social cohesion and career
advancement focus on the motivation of managers themselves. The second angle is the
market vs. the state (Ma 2012; Lee 2007). From this angle, all five theories discussed
above neglect the role of the state. They are therefore categorized as market based. In
contrast, the state should be included in the analysis. Using the concept of control
(Fligstein 2001), some researchers believe the interorganizational network can be
understood as the result of the state’s control of the economy (Ma 2012). The third
angle is levels of network, which means that interlocking networks can be divided into
primary and secondary interlocks. The term “primary interlocks” refers to interlocks by
nonindependents, while “secondary interlocks” refers to interlocks by independents. In
addition, there are also explanations derived from the geographical closeness of inter-
locking companies (Kono et al. 1998); these are not included in our discussion due to
their lack of sociological imagination.
As Mizruchi suggests, although the five theories discussed above have some internal
conflicts, they can well explain the interlocking of boards among American corpora-
tions. However, once we apply these theories to China’s case, one immediately sees the
limit of their explanatory power. First, these theories mainly deal with primary inter-
locks—for example, legitimacy theory predicts that the company in question would ac-
tively seek to put its own board members on the boards of other companies, yet most
boards’ interlocks in Chinese listed companies have changed into secondary interlocks.
Therefore, these theories cannot explain China’s case very well. Second, some tests on
existing theories made by Chinese researchers show poor support of these theories.
Third, these theories do not account for the background of institutionalization, nor do
they address institutional actors.
Thus to understand the network structure, one has to analyze the institutionalization
process and view independent directors as institutional actors. First, the institution de-
fines the structural positions of actors and their characteristics. According to the rule,
at least one third of board members should be independents, thus creating nearly
10,000 new jobs. Such a large group of directors simply cannot be recruited within the
field and has to be drawn from other fields. When a large number of executives are re-
cruited to meet the demands of rapid institutionalization, their previous status and pro-
fessional characteristics are not completely wiped out. In other words, independent
directors still possess their original status in the new institution. For example, it is well
known that retired government officials or professors make up a large proportion of in-
dependent directors. Therefore, in the same structural position, there can be institu-
tional actors with different statuses.
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Second, the institution allows a personalized relationship between the firm and the
directors. According to the rule, the independent director, who belongs to the “outside
directors” group, has to be nominated by a major shareholder.5 This rule has several
consequences. First, the recruitment relies mainly on major shareholders’ social ties,
which means the behavior of new directors is likely to be restricted by their ties. Sec-
ond, the fact that major shareholders can hire independents according to their own will
makes it possible for them to use independent directors as a resource in seeking poten-
tial interests, either for themselves or for the company.
Finally, at the macro level, as independent directors coming from other fields, such
as the government or universities, entered the market, new intersections of political,
economic, and academic fields are created. The norms and structural features of other
fields may therefore be imported into corporate governance by actors of multiple sta-
tuses. In this way the structural features of political and academic fields may be pro-
jected onto the image of the new institution.
Methods
We used two-mode networks to present the relation between firms and directors, as
shown in Fig. 1. The different numbers in the graph indicate different directors, while
letters stand for firms. The network in the middle of the graph is a two-mode network,6
and the left and right networks are transformed one-mode networks of directors and
firms. Under this frame, we can define the “heterogeneity of interlocking” when inter-
locks are brought about by independent directors with different former statuses. This
heterogeneity simply means that ties of the same form can have different properties, an
idea similar to Chamberlain’s on the heterogeneity of products (Shen 2007). I argue that
the heterogeneity of interlocks also exists. Since the idea of a network is an ontological
expression of structural features, there is no reason to believe that such an expression
cannot be further decomposed. The problem of the inability to show the heterogeneity
of relations from an aggregated network could probably be solved by decomposing the
network into parts according to different types of institutional actors.
One institution, two networks
Because of China’s specific economic and political environment, scholars have pointed
out that organizations in China often face dual pressures in response to different


















Fig. 1 Two-mode networks between firms and independent directors change “network” to “networks”
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environments (Shen and Sun 2000). Among the listed companies, we found that firms
often hire independent directors from various other fields. This article focuses on only
two types of independent directors: directors with political backgrounds, that is, former
government officials, and accounting specialists, mainly professors from accounting de-
partments and professional managers. Focusing on these two groups is both easy for
comparison and sufficient to show possible network heterogeneity. For simplicity, the
interlocking networks linked by independent directors with political backgrounds will
henceforth be called “political networks,” while the networks linked by specialists will
be called “professional networks.” Thus, we are able to decompose the interlocking net-
work based on the backgrounds of the directors.7 (The more detailed procedure of de-
composing the networks is provided in the Appendix). How do institutional actors
shape the structure of two-mode networks? I selected data on listed companies in China’s
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in 2011 for analysis.8
Political networks: projection of political hierarchy
Because of their political backgrounds, retired government officials still have political
rank when they become independent directors. The bureaucratic system has made the
rank of an official the most fundamental criteria of measuring his power. This indicates
that officials of different ranks, even when retired, bring different amounts of resources
to firms. Some scholars have pointed out that a main reason why listed companies in
China invite retired officials to sit on boards is that they connect to resources and can
provide protection for the company (Liao et al. 2009).9 Some researchers have found
that local governments often provide listed companies with financial subsidies (Chen
and Li 2001; Chen 2003). Although these findings are from 10 years ago, path depend-
ence still exists. In fact, in the analysis, I found that politically independent directors
mainly come from the following departments: Bureau of Finance, State/Local Tax Bur-
eau, Bureau of Legislation, Bureau of Industry, Bureau of Economy and Trade, the
State-owned Asset Commission, and the CSRC. It can be inferred that independent di-
rectors from these departments can provide firms with financial resources, policy infor-
mation, and even judicial protection.
Inviting higher-level retired officials brings better resources and protection. The col-
lective demands will consequently be such that officials of higher rank are in more de-
mand. As the rank decreases, politically independent directors will be less appealing. In
this way, the bureaucratic hierarchy affects firm-director relations, as is shown in the
two-mode network in Fig. 2 (circles stand for officials; numbers above the circles indi-
cate officials’ ranks, 1 is the highest; and arrows stand for intentions of inviting officials
1      2        3 4      5
Fig. 2 Rank-based asymmetry of demand and supply
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to the firm). The asymmetry results from the differences of power by rank. For inter-
locking networks, directors of higher rank will attract more links and therefore bring
about more interlocks.
At the same time, we should also recognize that the bureaucratic structure takes a
pyramid form, creating a negative relationship between the level of officials and the
population at that level. As a result, the population of officials increases geometrically
as the level goes down linearly. This affects the accessibility of officials. The higher the
rank of an official, the less likely that listed companies will have access to that official.
In addition, in some cases, inviting high-rank retired officials creates some risk10 since
this is more likely to be criticized by the media and CSRC. Therefore, accessibility in-
creases as bureaucratic rank decreases (see Fig. 3).
Combining the two conditions of accessibility and rank, we find that officials at the
middle level of the bureaucratic system are the most popular candidates for independ-
ent director positions (see Figs. 4 and 5).
To see if this is true in general, I checked the distribution of politically independent
directors by rank (see Fig. 5). We can see that most came from the middle of the bur-
eaucratic order (first, the department level and, second, the division level). The number
of political directors decreases as the rank goes up to the ministry level or down to the
section level.
The average number of interlocks created by officials are shown in Table 1.
The average number of interlocks can be calculated as 1.3 per person for officials at
the ministry level, 2.4 at the department level, 1.7 at the division level, and 1.5 at the
section level.11
We found that in political networks, about 75 percent of interlocks are created
by department-level political directors, 21 percent by divisional-level directors, only
about 3 percent by ministry-level directors, and 1 percent by the lowest-level offi-
cials. Because of the differences in rank and accessibility, most firms invite
department-level officials to sit on boards; on average, their ability to bring about
interlocks seems to be higher than that of other officials. They become the major
linkages in political networks.
Professional networks: projection of flat reputation structure
Unlike political directors, professional accounting specialists vary in their backgrounds.
They come relatively evenly from three areas: academia, senior members in associations
of certified public accountants, and managers from other industries. Firms show no
1         2         3          4         5 
Fig. 3 Population-based asymmetry of demand and supply
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preference of one type over another. The diversity of professional independent directors
also lies in the fact that the criteria of a “good” specialist director is not as clear as that
of a good political director, which can easily be identified from his position in the bur-
eaucratic system. In interviews, some professional directors from academia confirmed
that while large listed companies usually prefer professors from prestigious universities,
small listed companies do not since they are more practical.
More statistical analyses are needed. In an incomplete demonstration, here I selected
for analysis the group of independent directors from academia that are found to have
the highest level of interlocks (all of them were board members for four or more listed
firms in 2011). Since there are three main levels of universities from which these inde-
pendents are drawn, I wanted to determine whether there is a similar rank-based distri-
bution among universities. From highest to lowest, the well-accepted three levels are
“985 project” key universities (39), “211 project” universities (around 100), and other
universities and colleges. The logic of the analysis is that if a similar logic of rank exists
as in political networks, we would find that at the top (in this case, a group of 26 pro-
fessors who seem to be the most appealing to companies), it is unlikely that there will
be many professors from the lowest-level universities (Table 2).
As can be seen, the level of university does not appear to play a major role since uni-
versities at the lowest level compose more than one third of the top group. It is more












Ministry Department Division Section
Fig. 5 Number of officials who created interlocks by rank (political networks, 2011)
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determinant since almost all professors listed on the top are either chairs of the depart-
ment or heads of the school. For professional directors, the level of the organization is
not as important. This “flat” structure of professional interlocking networks contrasts
to political networks, for which the level of the organization is a major factor.
Table 1 Average number of officials and interlocks by bureaucratic rank (political networks)
Rank Ministry level (Bu) Department level (Ting) Division level (Chu) Section level (Ke)
No. of officials
(no. of interlocks)
10 (13) 118 (283) 46 (78) 2 (3)





University of Chongqing Chair, Dept. of Accounting 985
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Vice-president, School of Accounting 211
Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,
Shenzhen University
President, School of Economics Other
Southwestern University of Finance
and Economics
President, School of Accounting 211
Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics President, School of Accounting Other
Hunan University President, School of Accounting 985
Shenzhen University President, School of Accounting Other
Beijing National Accounting Institute Chair, Dean’s Office Other
Shanghai Lixin Accounting Institute Vice-president, School of Accounting Other
Renmin University of China Vice-party secretary, School of Business 985
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Professor, Dept. of Accounting 211
Shanghai Lixin Accounting Institute Dean’s Assistant Other
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Associate professor, Dept. of Accounting 211
Xiamen University Associate professor, Dept. of Accounting 985
Renmin University of China Chair, Dept. of Accounting 985
Fuzhou University Vice-president, School of Management Other
South China University of Technology Vice-president, School of Economics & Trade 985
Southwestern University of Finance
and Economics
Head of Dept. of Accounting 211
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Vice-president, School of Accounting 211
Xiamen University Vice-chair, Research Center of Accounting 985
Nanjing University Vice-chair, School of Management 985
Fuzhou University Chair, Dept. of Accounting Other
Hangzhou University of Electronic Science
& Technology
Vice-chair, Dept. of Accounting Other
Hefei University of Technology Dept. of Accounting 211
Hangzhou University of Electronic Science
& Technology
Vice-president, Dept. of Finance and Economics Other
Hunan University President, School of Accounting 985
Sum
University Level 985 211 Other
Number (percentage) 9 (34.6 %) 7 (27 %) 10 (38.5 %)
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To conclude, at the micro level we saw that independent directors, carrying norms
and structural features from their original positions, formed heterogeneous relation-
ships with firms. At the macro level, the institution of independent directors con-
nected other fields with the economic field, creating new exchange opportunities
among them; the interlocking network of firms consequently reflected such intersec-
tions. The political network absorbed a strong organizational feature from the
bureaucratic system into its structure, while the professional network reflected a
relatively weak role of the level of organizations.
Results
Heterogeneous networks among firms
The analysis above explains how two different types of interlocks are created. From
the institutional approach, we no longer use connectivity as the only criteria but
decompose the network to show its features. After transforming the two-mode net-
work into a one-mode interorganizational network, we see significant differences
between political networks and professional networks.
We can see a big clump at the rim of Fig. 6, with many other isolated nodes in
the middle (due to the layout in Ucinet). The whole network shows high inequal-
ity. In contrast, professional networks are denser, with many small clusters (see
Fig. 7).
We move forward from the big picture to more specific network features: the re-
gional closeness and industrial closeness of interlocks. Industrial and regional close-
ness are important aspects of boards interlocking. Interlocks of firms in the same
industry can lead to unfair competition, while interlocks of firms across different re-
gions connect local markets in different regions. We tested the difference between
industrial closeness and regional closeness using the QAP (quadratic assignment pro-
cedure) correlation analysis. Industrial closeness is measured by an n*n matrix: if
firm i and firm j belong to the same industry, the corresponding cell is assigned the
value of 1, otherwise 0. Similarly, for cells in the matrix of regional closeness, if two
Fig. 6 Political networks (2011)
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firms are registered in the same province, it takes the value of 1, otherwise 0. QAP
tests the correlation of each of the two networks with that of the interlocking
network matrix. We can see from Table 3 that an interlock is more likely to happen
within the industry in a political network than in a professional network, while
professional networks show a higher level of regional closeness.12
These differences are due to the fact that in political networks, some ties are formed
by companies who invite retired officials in the corresponding ministry of the central
government to be board members. Because of this, these officials link firms in the same
industry in different provinces, increasing the degree of industrial closeness as well as
the degree of cross-region connections. As an example, Table 4 shows a case in which
five companies shared an independent director who was a retired official of the
Ministry of Information.
These firms all belong to the same industry but are located in various provinces,
showing the characteristic of “industrial sheltering.” This differs from those in pro-
fessional networks. Quoting a firm manager: “[These officials] can bring benefits to
us just by sitting there and doing nothing. … Firms choose retired officials as
directors or supervisors because of their influence and coordination in the
industry.”13
Fig. 7 Professional networks (2011)
Table 3 QAP analysis of industrial closeness and regional closeness of ties (2011)
Industrial closeness Coefficient p value
Professional networks −0.000 0.415
Political networks 0.004 0.000***
Regional closeness Coefficient Significance
Professional networks 0.026 0.000***
Political networks 0.013 0.000***
For all the QAP analyses below, firms that are both politically connected and professionally connected were dropped
since the partial correlation is unidentifiable for these pairs
***0.1 % level
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The influence of networks on the institution: corporate governance and
synchronization of stock price volatility
The analysis above shows the heterogeneity of two networks, each reflecting the norms
and structures of another field because of different institutional actors. What would the
consequences of network heterogeneity be? Following the same logic, here I change the
direction of analysis to test the influence of network heterogeneity on the functionality
of the institution.
First, let us look at corporate governance. The institution of independent directors
has been designed to be a fundamental part of corporate governance; we thus expect
that the more effective the institution, the better the performance in corporate govern-
ance. One difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness is that institutionalization has made
firms highly homogeneous since most listed companies have the same number and the
same proportion of independent directors on their boards. We are unable to judge
whether one firm is better than another in terms of the effectiveness of independent
directors simply from their form. However, firms still differ in their network positions
in both political and professional networks.
According to social network theory, ties can channel information and provide con-
straints. If an independent director connects several companies, there may be more
frequent flows of information among these companies; the company may thus be able
to design a better strategy for governance. In addition, the independent director tends
to be less constrained than when he is hired by only one company, therefore better en-
suring his independence (Chen and Xie 2012). In this sense, we expect that interlocks
improve the effectiveness of independent directors and contribute to corporate govern-
ance. In addition, due to the existence of network heterogeneity, interlocks may have
different functions. In political networks, firms often choose officials in pursuit of
financial interest and protection. This can lead to “substitution of legitimacy” since a
political connection may increase the survival opportunity of a company and therefore
decrease the pressure of legitimacy on corporate governance. Consequently, it is likely
that in political networks, interlocks may not have positive effects on corporate
governance.
Table 4 An example of political interlock (2011)
Company name Registration
place
Industry Law firm Duration
Taiji (002368) Beijing, Haidian Electronics and information: computer
and external equipment, IC, software
and communication devices




communication systems and devices,
computers and components, software
Haiwen law firm 2010–2012
Wanda (300168) Shanghai,
Guiping
Electronics and information: technical
advice in computer industry,
computers and components










Caihong (600707) Shanxi, Xi’an Electronic components: color monitor
components, electronic products and
components, raw material
– 2005–2012
Data from Oriental Fortune (www.eastmoney.com), CSMAR
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To test this hypothesis, I compared the relatedness of the ten largest shareholders in
different network positions. This indicator has been widely used to reflect the share-
holder structure of listed companies and is related to the degree of potential insider
transaction problem (therefore a negative signal of corporate governance). According
to the guidance of the CSRC, every listed company must report their situation.14 If in-
dependent directors are effective, the connection between the ten largest shareholders
will decrease. We created a dummy variable (Related_top10) and assigned the value of
1 to indicate no connections and 0 otherwise.
The independent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is linked to
others in each network (Poli_interlock; Pro_interlock). Control variables included num-
ber of political independent directors (Num_PoliD); number of professional directors
(Num_ProD), whether the firm is state owned (state own); number of employees (take
log); number of shareholders (take log), whether the stock of the company is given
special treatment (ST); and industry (1–13). The statistical summary of variables is
shown in Table 5.
The result of logit regression is shown in Table 6.
As is shown in the table, after controlling a set of variables, political interlock has no
effect on the dependent variable, but professional interlock significantly lowered the
probability of relatedness between the ten largest shareholders.15 The result supports
our hypothesis that the effectiveness of network ties on corporate governance is condi-
tioned. Actors in the network are conditioned by their original status, which further
determines the property of the network tie. In professional networks, interlocking ties
help channel information flows and reduce network constraint, thus contributing to
the functioning of independent directors. In political networks, however, interlocking
Table 5 Summary of key variables
Mean Standard dev Min Max
Related_Top10 0.91 0.28 0 1
Poli_Interlock 0.2 0.4 0 1
Pro_Interlock 0.6 0.49 0 1
State owned 0.39 0.49 0 1
Num_PoliD 1.18 0.59 0 4
Num_ProD 0.47 0.71 0 4
No. of employees (LN) 7.47 1.4 1.79 13.22
No. of shareholders (LN) 10.17 1.11 1.61 13.92
Special treatment (ST) 0.03 0.17 0 1
Industry (code)a Percentage (%) Industry code Percentage (%)
Industry 1(A) 1.3 Industry 8(H) 5.8
Industry 2(B) 2.2 Industry 9(I) 2.2
Industry 3(C) 62.5 Industry 10(J) 4.8
Industry 4(D) 2.2 Industry 11(K) 3
Industry 5(E) 2 Industry 12(L) 1
Industry 6(F) 2.8 Industry 13(M) 1.7
Industry 7(G) 8.5
aAccording to the main industry categories in “Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed Companies (2001)” by
the CSRC
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ties only result from the company’s pursuit of interests without responding to institu-
tional legitimacy and thus do not contribute to corporate governance.
As for the other variables, the number of independent directors has no effect. Size of
the firm measured by number of employees may increase the probability of related
large shareholders. Firms given special treatment are less likely to have related large
shareholders since they are under much more supervision. The results remained stable
after introducing industry dummies.
Similarly, below I analyze the synchronization of stock price volatility. Independent
directors are expected to reduce the insider problem through their supervision, making
a firm’s heterogeneous information more likely to be reflected in its stock price.
Roughly speaking, this means that the performance change can be seen through the
change in the stock price. Synchronization is usually measured by R2 (the higher the
R2, the higher the synchronization). According to previous research, emerging econ-
omies tend to have higher R2 in the stock market (Li et al. 2012).
QAP analysis was performed to show whether interlocking firms tend to have similar
R2. The matrix of R2 is defined as follows: for each pair of firms (i, j), R2 is first put
into one of four intervals (0–25, 25–50, 50–70, 75–100 %). If the R2 of the two firms
Table 6 Logit model of whether ten largest shareholders are related (2011, nested)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Poli_Interlock 0.0559 (0.242) 0.0586 (0.352) 0.0292 (0.355)
Pro_Interlock −0.437** (0.210) −0.537** (0.232) −0.552** (0.237)
State owned 0.220 (0.206) 0.0242 (0.226) 0.0024 (0.239)
Num_PoliD 0.250 (.187) 0.230 (0.188)
Num_ProD −0.0314 (0.198) −0.0296 (0.206)
No. of employees (LN) 0.192*** (0.0774) 0.222 (0.0849)
No. of shareholders (LN) 0.0485 (0.101) 0.003 (0.111)
Special treatment (ST) −1.038*** (0.410) −1.099*** (0.427)
Industry 1 −1.202 (1.322)
Industry 2 −1.548 (1.266)
Industry 3 −0.896 (1.107)
Industry 4 −0.751 (1.318)
Industry 5 −1.009 (1.324)
Industry 6 −1.072 (1.244)
Industry 7 −1.743 (1.126)
Industry 8 −1.135 (1.165)
Industry 9 −1.398 (1.331)
Industry 10 −0.621 (1.177)
Industry 11 −0.499 (1.300)
Industry 12 −1.454 (1.310)
Constant 2.538*** (0.184) 0.566 (0.983) 1.870 (1.403)
Sample sizea 1323 1321 1321
Industry 13 as the base category, standard deviation in parentheses
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001
aSince there are great many missing values, regressions were run to test whether independent variables affected the
probability of missing values. The results show that except for number of employees, none of the independent variables
are correlated with missing values
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falls into the same interval, then the cell (i, j) of the matrix is assigned the value 1,
otherwise 0. Table 7 presents the results.
As we can see, firms with political interlocks tend to have more similar R2 than those
that without. In contrast, professional interlocks are not related to similarity of R2. The
reason behind this phenomenon should be discussed in future research. Here, it only
implies that network heterogeneity may have different effects on the institution of inde-
pendent directors.
Conclusion
How do imported institutions get established and become effective? This question has
intrigued many Chinese scholars. This article chose the institution of independent di-
rectors as an example, analyzed the corresponding interlocking networks of the institu-
tion, and demonstrated the influence of previous status on the new institution.
This article makes two main arguments. First, during the process of institutionalization,
actors brought in features from other fields, creating heterogeneous networks. Political
networks project the hierarchical organizational structure of bureaucratic systems in the
economic field while professional networks project a flat organizational structure. In this
way, the new institution reshapes the networks among firms. Of the two networks, the
political network may be worth more attention. Previous literature has discussed how pol-
itical tradition can shape the pattern of economic activities (Dobin 2008; Stark and Vedres
2012). Following this approach, the features in political networks reveal how a bureau-
cratic structure can be projected onto interfirm relationships, which indicates that firm-
specific characteristics (such as the nature of the firm) are not the only ones that can
affect interlocking network structures (Ma 2012).
Second, the network has feedback on the institution, and heterogeneous relations can
alter the direction of the network effect. The statement that institutional actors are em-
bedded in their networks in a way that constrains their actions should be modified be-
cause of the existence of heterogeneous relations. The network effect is conditioned on
its property, as is shown in the two different networks. This calls for further reflection
on the institutionalization process in general. A central critique of institutionalism is its
lack of discussion on actors. This study shows that when an imported institution cre-
ates a new group of actors, their original status matters. We therefore cannot neglect
actors in studying isomorphism.
Both arguments point to the importance of the original status of independent direc-
tors. Structural constraints in other fields are mixed in the new institution, which
evolves into a different shape. This study may shed some light on the relation between
network theory and neoinstitutionalism. Scholars like Frank Dobin have called for a
“friendly merger” of the two approaches, proposing that the two theories should be
combined in explanation. Efforts have been made along this line but have only
Table 7 QAP analysis of interlocks and synchronization of stock price volatility (2011)
Coef. p value
Professional networks −0.000 0.25
Political networks 0.001 0.05
Using the same method as above
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concluded that institutions spread through organizational networks. From the case in
this article, we found that while the institution defines the possible features of
organizational networks, these networks have different effects on the institution due to
network heterogeneity. In this way, a friendly merger helps us to better understand and
measure institutional isomorphism from the perspective of the network.
Lastly, and interestingly enough, the institution is also constantly redefining inde-
pendent director candidacies. The party may have noticed the negative influence of pol-
itical directors, since in October 2013 the “18th document” restricted the possibility of
government officials becoming independent directors by canceling their salaries.
Whether this new regulation reshaped the interlocking network and changed the insti-
tution of independent directors remains a good research topic for the future.
Endnotes
1See Sina Finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20110905/005510430377.shtml).
2Guiding opinion on establishment of Independent Director Systems, 2001.
3According to the “opinion,” before June 30, 2002, at least two independents must be
included in boards, and by the end of June 2003, the proportion of independent direc-
tors had to reach one third.
4According to Article 25 of “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-
Owned Assets of Enterprises,” without the permission of the general meeting, directors
in state-owned, state-joint-listed companies could not serve on boards of other com-
panies in the same industry.
5Boards of directors and boards of supervisors can also nominate new independent
directors, but they have to be approved at the general meeting.
6The original figure is from Latapy (Latapy et al. 2008), this one is redrawn by the
author.Due to the existence of different types of relations in the data set, social network
analysts have defined the mode of a network. The mode is measured by the number of
types of entities. The networks we usually consider are either a one-mode network or a
two-mode network. If nodes in the network all belong to the same type, as in the case
of friend networks, and every pair of relations is thought to exist between the same
types of individuals, the network is considered to be a one-mode network. If the net-
work contains two types of entities such as individuals and organizations (say, profes-
sors and universities), the network is a two-mode network. In short, the key is to
identify how many types of entities are taken into account: teachers and students,
teachers and classes, and volunteers and volunteer organizations can all be thought of
as networks consisting of two types of entities (Borgatti & Everett 1997).
7The detailed method of identifying the background of directors and generating het-
erogeneous network is shown in the Appendix.
8There are three reasons why I only selected the year 2011. First, for the moment
2011 is the latest year. At an early period (such as 2002–2003), institutionalization was
in process and things were unclear to most people at that time; the year 2005 saw split-
share reform, which greatly changed the properties of companies and their interrela-
tions. By 2011, the institution of independent directors had passed the unstable stage.
Second, the raw data containing the information on director backgrounds is difficult to
code solely by computer since there are name issues and incomplete information. To
improve the quality of data, I had to check the results manually after coding thousands
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of records by computer; this inevitably increased the amount of work. As a trade-off, I
only picked one year’s data so that manual checking was possible. Third, 2011 is a turn-
ing point if we compare the number of state-owned companies and that of private
companies; in that year, about half of listed companies in the A-share market were pri-
vate companies for the first time (the number is 1204, as opposed to 1193 state-owned
companies). Around 2000, the A-share market was mostly taken up by state-owned
companies, meaning that the interrelation among firms at that time mainly followed a
bureaucratic logic.
9Here, we do not discuss whether such protection takes the form of “option” or
“magnetic field” (see http://finance.inewsweek.cn/20130911,71144,all.html).
10See http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-08/15/c_125173948.htm.
11This difference is not statistically significant; the confidence level is 0.15, probably
due to the fact that the variance of department-level interlocks is relatively large. Thus,
we cannot conclude that department-level directors are more likely to create interlocks.
A better test would require obtaining the real number of retired officials at each level
as a total population, which is very difficult.
12According to the main industry categories in “Guidelines for the Industry Classifi-
cation of Listed Companies (2001)” by the CSRC. The low value of correlation is due to
the fact that the relation matrix is high dimensional and sparse.
13See Sina Finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20130812/091016416485.shtml).
14We assume that their yearly reports can be trusted.
15I also analyzed another indicator of corporate governance: the sensitivity of per-
formance salary of managers, which showed similar results—professional interlocks
help increase sensitivity, while political interlocks do not. The results are not listed here
due to limited space.
Appendix
Notes on data and methods of heterogeneous network decomposition
The data used in this article come from two databases: CSMAR and RESSET, both of which
provide a comprehensive description of corporate governance and information on managers,
including job information of independent directors such as name, gender, year of birth, CV,
and part-time jobs. Compared with data from RESSET, data from CSMAR is of higher quality.
I thus mainly relied on data from CSMAR while using RESSETas a complementary database.
I also obtained basic information on listed companies, including their registration place
(to measure regional closeness), nature of the firm (state owned or private), industry type,
number of shareholders, number of employees, special treatment (ST), number of board
members, number of independent directors, and so on. Some of these are used as control
variables.
I performed the following work after data clearing: first, dropped non-A-share com-
panies, namely those that are not listed in the mainland stock market; second, sepa-
rated all data by year and generated yearly lists of companies without delisted ones; and
third, dropped firms with incomplete information.
One of the main points in this article is to analyze interlocking networks from net-
work heterogeneity. Therefore, extracting the heterogeneous networks from data is a
key step. This presented several difficulties: first, in order to identify the type of inter-
locking network ties, one needs to know the background of an independent director,
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but there are thousands of records for each year. Second, neither of the two databases
contains a complete set of information. One thus needs to merge the information in
the two databases, which is difficult to do manually. Finally, it is likely that coding the
resume of independent directors to identify their backgrounds could be subjective, so
one needs some objective rules.
After some trial and error, I relied on the word segmentation technique in natural
language processing.
First, I did word segmentation for all resumes, then dropped all unimportant words
(such as “born,” “serve as”). After this, I sorted the remaining words to create a short
list of keywords of high frequency, from which one can precisely determine the back-
ground of an independent director.
For instance, a portion of a resume is shown below:
Mr. Chu Yijun, Independent Director. Born in 1964, PhD. in Accounting, Accounting
Professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economy, Doctoral Supervisor. Gradu-
ated from Shanghai University of Finance and Economy, now serves as an Accounting
Professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economy, Doctoral Supervisor, Ac-
counting Standards Advisory Specialist of the Ministry of Finance Accounting Stan-
dards Committee, Senior Advisory Specialist in Accounting Series of the Ministry of
Public Security, Chinese Accounting Association Education Branch Executing Secretary
General, researcher in Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Key Re-
search Center in the Academy of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Fi-
nance and Economy, Managing Director of 6th Board of Management of Chinese
Accounting Association Branch of Financial Cost.
Keywords extracted from this resume are “accounting,” “finance,” “professor,” and so
on. These words are counted in the high-frequency word list. As is shown, some words
like “accounting” occurred very frequently, indicating that this independent director is
apparently a professional director from academia.
Let us now look at another piece:
Wang Xingzhong, male, Han, from Zichuan Guanghan, member of the Communist
Party, born in August 1944, senior accountant, bachelor’s degree, formerly Vice-President
of Economic Committee of Mianyang, Vice Chief of the Bureau of Finance in Mianyang
City, Chief and also Chief of the Bureau of Local Taxation. Mianyang City Government
Assistant Mayor, Vice Mayor, now retired. ndependent Director of the company.
Keywords from this resume are “accountant,” “Economic Committee,” “Bureau of Fi-
nance,” “Vice Chief,” “Bureau of Local Taxation,” “government,” and “Vice Mayor.”
Therefore, it is easy to determine that this man was a former government official and
also an accountant.
Similarly, using the work segmentation technique, we can extract all the keywords in
each record and generate a high-frequency word list in which words can be used to
identify the background of a director. Shortening the high-frequency word list was
done manually. Ambiguous words were dropped, leaving those that are simple and
clear: the word “accounting” and “accountant” are good indicators of a professional dir-
ector. Similarly, “Bureau of Finance,” “Vice Chief,” and “Vice Mayor” are good indica-
tors of a political director.
A further step is to assign scores to each independent director. If there are many
accounting-related keywords, the score for “professional director” increases, indicating
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that the likelihood of the director being a professional director increases. Scoring polit-
ical directors is a similar process. Note that this method allows a director to be simul-
taneously political and professional.
Finally, we can rely on the scores of each director to generate network matrices, fol-
lowing standard methods. I double-checked some of the names by looking at sex and
year of birth. An interlocking relation exists between two firms if they share at least
one independent director, and the corresponding cell in the network matrix is assigned
a value of 1, otherwise 0. The rest was simple once the network matrix was established.
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